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Two months after Ronald Reagan assumed office as the fortieth president of the United States, 
Bernie Sanders was elected the thirty-second mayor of Burlington, Vermont. Both men remained 
in office for eight years. When Reagan stepped down in 1989, his policies and programs were 
continued by his vice-president, who was elevated to the presidency by the same conservative 
coalition that had supported Reagan. Sanders stepped down in 1989 after serving four two-year 
terms as mayor. His policies and programs were continued by Peter Clavelle, who had served as 
Sanders’s director of community and economic development. Clavelle was carried into office on 
the shoulders of Burlington’s “Progressive Coalition,’ the same third-party movement that had 
supported Sanders. 
There is considerable irony in the fact that the decade of the “Reagan revolution” in Washington 
was also the decade of “Sanderista” rule in Burlington. These two political movements had little 
in common. Their leaders, Reagan and Sanders, shared even less. Indeed, it would have been 
difficult to find two elected officials anywhere in the United States during the 1980s who were 
further apart in background, ideology, and political agenda. 
The man elected president was a middle-class midwesterner of Irish descent whose entire career, 
first in the movies and then in politics, had been heavily bankrolled and carefully scripted by 
men of wealth and power. Ronald Reagan was the most conservative politician to occupy the 
White House in fifty years, a person whose entire political philosophy was built around the 
single idea that private individuals and private markets could solve nearly every problem of 
poverty, unemployment, and injustice if government would just stop meddling in matters that 
were not its proper concern. Reagan’s domestic agenda, accordingly, was dominated by a simple 
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bias: get government out of the way of the private sector, and let a rising tide of capitalist 
prosperity lift all boats. 
The man elected Burlington’s mayor grew up in a working-class Jewish household in Brooklyn, 
New York. Bernie Sanders wrote his own scripts, first as a documentary filmmaker and later as a 
political maverick operating outside the traditional two-party structure of American politics. He 
helped to found Vermont’s Liberty-Union Party soon after moving to the State in 1968. During 
the 1970s, he ran unsuccessfully for statewide office four times, never receiving more than 6 
percent of the vote. In 1981, he challenged the five-term Democratic mayor of Burlington. 
Running as an independent, Sanders mounted an aggressive campaign stridently attacking the 
city’s wealthiest individuals, interests, and institutions. He was given little money and little 
chance of success. Against all odds, he won—-by ten votes. 
A self-avowed socialist, Sanders’s conception of the role and responsibilities of government was 
a radical rebuke to the right-wing Republican elected president only a few months earlier. The 
market, in Sanders’s eyes, was the underlying cause of many of the problems faced by 
Burlington’s people, not an untapped solution. Only an activist municipal government could 
solve these problems, intervening on behalf of lower-income neighborhoods and working-class 
people to curb the market and correct the harm that market forces often inflicted on vulnerable 
populations. 
Nowhere was the need for municipal activism more apparent, believed Sanders and his 
supporters, than in housing. As Reagan was confidently extolling the virtues of unfettered 
markets, Burlington’s own market in land and housing was stampeding out of control. 
Speculative pressures had been building for several years: a revitalized central business district, 
with the prospect of luxury redevelopment on the downtown waterfront; a burgeoning student 
population at the University of Vermont, with no accompanying expansion of on-campus 
housing; and a robust regional economy that was attracting thousands of newcomers to the area 
every year. By the early 1980s, average housing prices in Burlington for both rental and owner-
occupied housing were rising at a rate roughly twice that of average household incomes (CEDO, 
1986; Mallach, 1988). Lower-income renters were being displaced as rental property rapidly and 
repeatedly changed hands from one investor to another. Lower-cost housing was being lost 
through conversion and demolition. New housing was being built at a rate unmatched since the 
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1950s, but most of these units were pricey condos overlooking Lake Champlain, the city’s 
western border. Few were affordable for Burlington’s less affluent residents. 
As the private sector was busily exacerbating Burlington’s housing problems—and brusquely 
excusing itself from any special responsibility for addressing them—the public sector was 
displaying a more dramatic abdication. Reagan had pledged to get government “off the backs” of 
the people. When it came to housing, he delivered on that promise with a vengeance. Federal 
support for public housing was cut. Support for the rehabilitation and construction of private 
housing was cut. Rental assistance was cut. Even the flagship of Richard Nixon’s New 
Federalism, the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) program was cut. So little 
federal funding remained by Reagan’s second term that most cities the size of Burlington were 
doing little more for affordable housing than hanging on with broken fingers to a crumbling 
stock of public housing, a threatened stock of federally assisted private housing, and a dwindling 
pool of CDBG dollars for housing rehabilitation. In short, when the federal government got out 
of the housing business, so did most of America’s smaller cities.1 
Burlington never joined this municipal rush for the exits. Admittedly, the burning theater of 
Reagan’s domestic policy was not the most desirable stage from which to launch an innovative 
housing program, but the Sanders administration was determined to play neither passive victim 
nor active accomplice to the federal retrenchment that was underway. Something better was 
expected by those who had voted for Sanders’s brand of municipal activism; something better 
was needed for those who were being excluded or extruded from Burlington’s overheated 
market. The difficulty faced by the “Sanderistas,” however, was that most of the federal 
programs used by previous mayors to construct or rehabilitate affordable housing were being 
gutted by a hostile president and a compliant Congress. The Sanderistas had to try something 
different, something new. 
 
TOWARD A PROGRESSIVE HOUSING POLICY 
Sanders’s first term was a season of siege.2 A combined Democratic and Republican majority on 
the city council impeded nearly every initiative, every budget, and every appointment of the new 
administration. The incoming mayor was not even permitted to hire a secretary for his own office 
without a major confrontation with the city council.  
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By the time of his first reelection, however, Sanders’s base of political support in the community 
and on the council had grown broad enough to break through the intransigence of his political 
opponents. Control of the city council remained with the Democrats and Republicans, but 
enough members of Sanders’s Progressive Coalition had been added to the council to sustain a 
mayoral veto.3 By 1983, Sanders finally possessed enough power to begin enacting some of his 
own policies and programs. Affordable housing was near the top of the Progressive agenda. 
Within the Sanders administration—and the Clavelle administration that followed—housing 
policy was largely a creature of the Community and Economic Development Office (CEDO). 
This municipal agency was created soon after Sanders’s 1983 reelection to give an activist 
mayor— forced to operate within the structural constraints of a weak mayor, strong city council, 
commission form of government—the ability to function proactively in shaping the city’s growth 
and development. CEDO was assigned general responsibility for economic development, 
community development, and housing. It was also given the politically lucrative task of   
administering and distributing the City’s annual allocation of Community Development Block 
Grant funds. 4 
Prominent in CEDO’s founding mission was the explicit charge “to develop, coordinate, and 
administer a comprehensive program to address the City’s housing needs” (Burlington City 
Council, 1983). This mission was eventually translated by CEDO staff into three easily 
understood and frequently repeated goals: protection of the vulnerable, production of new 
affordable housing, and preservation of affordable housing already in existence. 
The first of these goals sought to press into service the powers of municipal government on 
behalf of residents most at risk in a speculative, inflationary housing market. As later described 
by CEDO in the City’s 1988 Annual Report: “The housing situations of the poor, the disabled, 
and the elderly are often precarious. The needs of these populations are great; their resources are 
few. Their bargaining position in a competitive, high-priced housing market is extremely weak. 
The municipality must make the shelter of its most vulnerable citizens more secure.” 
Secondly, and most traditionally, CEDO embraced the goal of promoting the production of new 
housing. “Development,” after all, was part of the name of this new municipal agency. It was 
expected that CEDO staff would take the lead in identifying and assembling sites, acquiring and 
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packaging funds, and facilitating the construction of residential units affordable for lower-
income residents—those with annual incomes below 80 percent of median. 
Finally, there was early recognition within CEDO that preservation was as necessary as 
protection and production, especially in a city where 53 percent of the housing stock had been 
built before 1939. Striving to protect and house the city’s low-income residents without striving 
simultaneously to preserve the low-cost housing they occupied was like working to save an 
endangered species while acquiescing in the destruction of its only habitat. 
Problems of housing preservation were, in fact, some of the most pressing that the city faced: 
housing was being lost in inner-city neighborhoods through deterioration and deferred 
maintenance; housing was being lost in the neighborhoods surrounding the central business 
district, the University of Vermont, and Champlain College through demolition or conversion to 
nonresidential uses; affordable apartments were being lost in every neighborhood through luxury 
renovation or condominium conversion; and the clock was ticking on the city’s largest federally 
subsidized housing project, Northgate Apartments, a 336-unit rental complex constructed nearly 
twenty years before under the HUD 221(d) (3) program. Unless something was done before 1989 
to “save” Northgate, there was a high probability that the project’s current (or future) owners 
would elect to prepay the mortgage, terminate the rent stabilization agreement with HUD, and 
displace most of the project’s eleven hundred lower-income tenants—a community larger than 
most Vermont towns. 
There was nothing unusual or especially “progressive” about any of these housing goals. Many 
cities have pursued similar ends, although few have pursued them as aggressively, 
comprehensively, and successfully as Burlington. What was special about protection, production, 
and preservation at the hands of the Sanderistas, however, was the decision to pursue these goals 
through a dual-track strategy of empowering those without residential property and decommod-
ifying residential property itself. Their housing policy was, in effect, two separate policies: a 
policy of “tenants’ rights” focused primarily on the goal of protection, and a policy of “third 
sector housing” focused primarily on production and preservation. 
Only the policy of third sector housing is discussed in detail here. A few words should be said, 
however, about the administration’s political efforts on behalf of tenants’ rights. After all, 
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empowering persons without property was the administration’s first policy—and a seedbed for 
the second. 
The idea of enlisting municipal government in the cause of tenants’ rights predated the creation 
of CEDO. For that matter, it predated the election of Bernie Sanders. Neighborhood activists and 
tenant organizers had repeatedly petitioned the Democratic machine in City Hall throughout the 
1970s to play a larger role in protecting tenants against soaring rents, deteriorating apartments, 
and displacement. That such entreaties had fallen on deaf ears was undoubtedly a factor in 
Sanders’s surprising victory in 1981. Acknowledging that political debt, while seeking also to 
deliver on a prominent campaign promise, the new administration called for a special election 
two months after Sanders took office. Burlington’s voters were asked to approve a “fair housing 
commission,” a measure deemed by supporters and opponents alike to be little more than a 
stalking horse for rent control. It was defeated, three to one. 
Despite this early setback, the protection of tenants’ rights remained in the forefront of the 
administration’s legislative priorities. It was kept there by the administration’s close ties to the 
state’s small but feisty tenants’ movement, Vermont Tenants, Inc. (VTI), headquartered in 
Burlington, and by the administration’s recruitment of key staff from the ranks of pro-tenant 
housing activists and former legal aid attorneys. The most radical proposals put forward by the 
Sanders and Clavelle administrations, the Progressive Coalition, and VTI were defeated: an 
antispeculation tax on the sale of rental property was approved as a charter change by 
Burlington’s voters but later rejected by the Vermont legislature (1986); apartment registration 
was amended out of existence by the city council (1987); and just-cause eviction was voted 
down by Burlington’s electorate (1989). Progressives were more successful in winning approval 
for pro-tenant initiatives ensuring fair access, promoting health and safety, and preventing 
displacement. The most significant of these legislative victories were: 
     • Ensuring Fair Access. Anti-discrimination Ordinance (enacted 1984); Security Deposits 
Ordinance (enacted 1986) 
     • Promoting Health and Safety. Overhaul of Minimum Housing Code (amended 1985); 
Apartment Inspection Fee Ordinance (enacted 1987) 
     • Preventing Displacement. Condominium Conversion Ordinance (enacted 1987); Housing 
Replacement Ordinance (enacted 1989) 
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Not included in this list but equally important from the point of view of protecting tenants was 
the administration’s revitalization of the Burlington Housing Authority (BHA). Prior to 1984, the 
BHA was controlled by political appointees of the previous administration. Buildings were 
deteriorating, waiting lists were out of date, and tenants were not heard by the BHA board. As 
Sanders’s appointees to the BHA board gradually pushed aside the holdovers from the past, the 
BHA began to turn around. A talented new director was hired in 1985. That same year, a 
multimillion dollar modernization program was begun that aimed at rehabilitating all of the 
authority’s older units by 1993. Senior BHA staff were replaced. Waiting lists were revamped. 
Tenants were added to the BHA board. 
The turnaround of the BHA was pivotal to the overall success of the Progressives’ program, for 
the BHA straddled the line between protecting vulnerable populations and decommodifying 
valuable property. Progress toward improving conditions for the 347 families in public housing 
had to be ensured before less traditional measures could be pursued. In effect, the administration 
had to secure this weakened flank in the ranks of its own constituency before it could march off 
in new directions. Equally important, the BHA was the local custodian for what remained of the 
federal Section 8 program. This meant that the BHA was in a position to withhold certificates 
and vouchers from the third sector housing that CEDO’s nonprofit partners began to produce in 
1984 or to use such subsidies in support of their efforts. By reforming the BHA, the Sanders 
administration both improved tenants’ lives and enlisted the BHA in its push to remove housing 
from the speculative market. 5 
CEDO promoted this second policy on a parallel track with the first. The commitment to tenant 
protection and empowerment remained intact, but after 1984 an increasing amount of CEDO’s 
time and resources were dedicated to the creation of an expanding pool of privately owned, 
perpetually affordable housing. This third sector housing policy had two programmatic 
components: (1) municipal support for alternative models of housing tenure that could lock in 
place any public subsidies put into affordable housing, while locking in place affordability itself; 
and (2) municipal support for a network of nonprofit organizations that would work in concert 
with CEDO to establish these alternative models of tenure, while constructing, rehabilitating, and 
managing an expanding stock of permanently affordable housing. 
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The two components, in practice, were often indistinguishable; one frequently led to the other. 
Promoting a new form of tenure sometimes brought into existence a new nonprofit organization. 
Thus CEDO’s efforts to establish a legal, financial, and organizational foundation for price-
restricted models of homeownership led to the formation of the Burlington Community Land 
Trust (BCLT) in 1984 and the Champlain Valley Mutual Housing Federation in 1990. The 
BCLT became an aggressive developer of affordable housing. The Champlain Valley Mutual 
Housing Federation became the primary source of training and support for the region’s 
independently incorporated housing cooperatives—and the manager for all of the reserves built 
up by these cooperatives. 
Conversely, sometimes promoting a new organization has inadvertently introduced a new form 
of tenure. CEDO’s three-year support for a consortium of nonprofit organizations, gathered 
together to prevent the loss of Northgate Apartments, resulted not only in the successful 
acquisition and rehabilitation of this threatened project but in the creation of a tenant-controlled 
structure for owning and managing this property unlike any seen in Vermont before. 6 
At other times perpetual affordability has been achieved not by a new form of tenure but by the 
nonprofit status of a project’s developer and owner. Thus, during the same year that CEDO 
helped to create the Burlington Community Land Trust, CEDO staff joined with municipal 
officials from neighboring towns to establish another nonprofit, the Lake Champlain Housing 
Development Corporation. CEDO has also supported Cathedral Square, Inc. (established in 
1978) in developing affordable rental housing for the elderly and the Committee on Temporary 
Shelter (established in 1982) in developing emergency shelters and permanent single room-
occupancy (SRO) housing for the homeless. In each of these cases, the form of tenure is a rather 
traditional landlord-tenant relationship, but nonprofit ownership protects the long-term 
affordability of any units produced. 7 
In summary, while the Sanders administration was struggling to enact a series of measures 
within the city code for the protection of tenants, it was also working to establish new models 
and new organizations outside of City Hall for the production of housing with lasting 
affordability. These nonmarket models of tenure eventually included a citywide community land 
trust, limited equity condominiums, nonprofit and tenant-managed rentals, and a growing 
number of limited equity cooperatives tied together in a federated structure. Nonprofit 
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organizations for the production and management of affordable housing eventually included the 
Burlington Community Land Trust, the Lake Champlain Housing Development Corporation, the 
Committee on Temporary Shelter, Northgate Housing, Inc., and CEDO support for the ongoing 
development activities of a preexisting nonprofit, Cathedral Square, Inc. By the end of 1992, 
nearly eight hundred units of privately owned, perpetually affordable housing had been created 
by CEDO’s nonprofit partners through either the construction of new housing or the 
rehabilitation of old. 
 
WHY THIRD SECTOR HOUSING? 
Why did the Sanders administration decide to adopt a third sector housing policy? What were the 
strategic considerations behind a policy of directing municipal resources toward new housing 
models and new housing organizations created expressly for the purpose of decommodifying a 
growing percentage of Burlington’s privately owned housing? 
  Some of the realities and concerns that formed the backdrop for this third sector housing policy 
have been mentioned before: 
• Because federal funds for housing were drying up, new ways had to be found of doing more 
with less. It was clear that whatever was done for affordable housing would have to be 
accomplished using local powers, local resources, and local institutions to a greater degree than 
before. Little support—and even less leadership—could be expected from HUD. 
• Because local plans for developing Burlington’s waterfront were gearing up, new ways had to 
be found of investing in lower-income neighborhoods without displacing lower-income 
residents. It was clear that public and private investment in the central business district during the 
1970s had already put considerable pressure on the residential areas surrounding it. Speculative 
pressures would only increase with the planned redevelopment of the downtown waterfront. 
Whatever was done to improve these inner-city neighborhoods would have to be accomplished 
without further fueling an overheated housing market. 
• Because federal protections for the renters at Northgate were running out, new ways had to be 
found to produce affordable housing that avoided mistakes of the past. It was clear that even a 
twenty-year rent restriction was inadequate protection for scarce subsidies and vulnerable 
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tenants. As long as privately owned housing could eventually return to the private market, 
affordability could not be assured. 
The administration’s decision to pursue a policy of third sector housing was a conscious product 
of these practical considerations. There were political considerations as well. One of the main 
reasons for promoting new forms of price-restricted housing was the impossibility of achieving 
the same result via more conventional means. The crushing defeat of rent control by Burlington’s 
voters in 1981 and the watering down of every pro-tenant ordinance proposed to the city council 
in the years thereafter demonstrated the futility of looking primarily to the municipality’s police 
power to stabilize local housing costs. Similarly, any hope of expanding the public ownership of 
housing was out of the question. The BHA of the early 1980s was a stagnant mess, and any other 
form of municipal ownership would have required approval from the same electorate that had 
soundly rejected the administration’s bid to regulate rents. Prevented from following familiar 
paths pioneered by progressives of the past, the Sanders administration was forced to go in a 
different direction. 
A politically more acceptable path than public control or public ownership was the prospect of 
decommodifying residential property by means of private contracts and private ownership. What 
a hostile Democratic and Republican majority on the city council would never accept, and what a 
majority of the electorate seemed reluctant to accept if enforced by Progressives in City Hall, 
became palatable and praiseworthy when pursued by private charities—that is, nonprofit housing 
development organizations with a 501(c) (3) status. Even better, one of these CEDO-sponsored 
organizations, the Burlington Community Land Trust, held out the irresistible promise of 
homeownership for all. True, there were contractual limits on the amount of appreciation that 
these homeowners could realize on the resale of their homes, but lifelong tenants were being 
offered a piece of the American Dream. So politically difficult was it for Democrats and 
Republicans to oppose such a lofty ideal that, despite their early opposition, they were soon 
jockeying for position on the BCLT bandwagon. By the 1989 election, the Democratic candidate 
for mayor was even suggesting that the BCLT had originally been a Democratic idea. 8 
Nonprofit control over private housing became a means of appeasing not only critics on the right 
but allies on the left. CEDO had established a home improvement program in 1983 that had 
begun directing hundreds of thousands of dollars in low-interest loans into the city’s oldest and 
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poorest neighborhoods. Some of these neighborhoods were among those most at risk from 
speculation and gentrification as the central business district continued to prosper and as plans 
for the downtown waterfront began to mature. Concerns were voiced by Vermont Tenants, Inc., 
and by newly elected Progressives to the city council that public investment in and around these 
inner-city neighborhoods would add to displacement pressures their constituents were already 
experiencing. 9 CEDO’s support for a citywide community land trust and for other 
nonspeculative models of housing was a programmatic response to such concerns, a way of 
investing in lower-income neighborhoods without displacing lower-income people. By 1988, 
most of CEDO’s home improvement dollars were going into units controlled by the BCLT, Lake 
Champlain Housing Development Corporation, or some other housing nonprofit. 
The existence of political constraints and the pursuit of political acceptability are not the entire 
explanation for this third sector housing policy, however. There was also a quest for continuity. 
Half of Burlington’s city council is elected every year. A mayoral election is held every other 
year. In 1981, when Bernie Sanders was first elected, his margin of victory was minuscule. No 
one expected the Progressives to hold onto City Hall very long. Just the opposite: there was an 
ever-present apprehension among Sanders’s supporters and staff that each year might be their 
last. Consequently, an unusual amount of attention was devoted to searching for municipal 
initiatives that might permanently alter the social landscape—initiatives that might out-live the 
Progressives’ temporary hold over City Hall.  
This was especially true in the case of affordable housing, the issue around which many of 
Burlington’s most contentious political battles were being waged. No other issue drew the line 
between the Progressives and their Democratic and Republican opponents more clearly. On no 
other issue did it seem more certain that the ouster of Progressives from City Hall would result in 
a dramatic reversal in municipal policy. CEDO staff argued from the beginning, therefore, that a 
nonprofit infrastructure should be established outside City Hall—independent of City Hall. Only 
in this way, it was believed, could whatever gains that were made in decommodifying residential 
property be protected against inevitable changes in the political wind. 
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INSTITUTIONALIZING PERPETUAL AFFORDABILITY 
As it turned out, Progressives remained in office throughout the decade and into the next. This 
meant not only that perpetual affordability became rooted in the purposes and programs of a 
network of nonprofit organizations established outside municipal government but that the same 
principle was gradually woven into the policies, programs, and plans of the municipality itself. 10 
The City’s support for perpetual affordability had its Burlington beginnings in the city council’s 
1983 decision to appropriate $200,000 for the start-up of a citywide community land trust. Few 
who voted for this original appropriation fully understood what a land trust was, let alone fully 
endorsed the decommodification of private property that lurked beneath the surface of this 
unfamiliar housing model. Even those on the council and within the Sanders administration who 
did understand and did endorse what was being proposed were hardly prepared to reorient all of 
the city’s housing efforts toward long-term affordability. The Burlington Community Land Trust 
was conceived as one initiative among many being considered for the protection of the city’s 
tenants, the preservation of the city’s housing, and the production of more affordable housing. 11 
By the time the BCLT was firmly underway, however, the principle of perpetual affordability 
had begun to influence more and more of CEDO’s thinking about affordable housing. A CEDO 
report that was adopted as an interim policy in September of 1984 recommended a complete 
review of all municipal land and housing programs with an eye toward linking these programs 
more closely with the BCLT. Listed prominently among the benefits of such a policy were the 
“retention of public subsidies,” “development without displacement,” and “rent stabilization 
without rent control.” The report was quite explicit in describing the wider implications of this 
new approach to affordable housing (CEDO, 1984: 4): “By permanently removing land from the 
marketplace and placing a ceiling on the resale price of housing, a CLT . . . can control housing 
costs. Such measures ‘decommodify’ land and housing, assuring long-term accessibility and 
affordability for persons of modest means.” 
References to perpetual affordability soon began appearing with great regularity in documents 
and reports issued by CEDO. The most influential of these was the Report and 
Recommendations of the Affordable Housing Task Force (CEDO, 1986), a publication that 
eventually became a virtual blueprint for most of CEDO’s subsequent housing efforts. The 
Affordable Housing Task Force was a committee of tenant advocates, public officials, and 
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private developers appointed by the city council in June 1985 to explore ways of addressing 
Burlington’s housing problems. Aside from the remarkable range of the twenty-five 
recommendations made by this committee for expanding and maintaining the supply of 
affordable housing, its final report is notable for the frequency with which perpetual affordability 
is mentioned. Thus the BCLT is praised for “creating a permanent stock of affordable housing 
for our community” (p. 12); the City is urged to support “cooperative housing, especially limited 
equity cooperative housing” (p. 19) and to ensure the “perpetual affordability” of any housing 
created through municipal grants of lands or funds (pp. 19, 20); CEDO is urged to utilize “a 
model such as a land trust, limited equity cooperative, or mutual housing program which assures 
perpetual affordability” to save the city’s threatened stock of federally subsidized housing (p. 
23). 
The Report and Recommendations made it clear that the notion of perpetually affordable housing 
had entered, by 1986, the mainstream of Burlington’s ongoing housing debate; various models 
for making such housing a reality had moreover become favored contenders for municipal 
support. By 1988, these models had become such a mainstay of the City’s policies and programs 
that CEDO added the “decommodification of housing” to the operational goals of its mission 
statement, declaring that “housing that is made affordable today, using sizeable public or private 
| subsidies, will only remain affordable if limits are placed on the profits that property owners 
may remove from their increasingly valuable commodity.” 
The final stage in this multiyear process of incorporating perpetual affordability into the 
institutional fabric of Burlington’s municipal policy was to make perpetual affordability, limited 
equity housing, and nonprofit development an explicit part of both the City’s municipal plan and 
the City’s Comprehensive Housing Affordability Strategy (CHAS). On May 3, 1991, the 
Burlington Planning Commission adopted a revised Municipal Development Plan that included 
among its housing policies the declaration that “the City of Burlington will . . . support housing 
models, organizations, and programs that insure perpetual affordability.” There are no less than 
nine references in the plan to the need for municipal support for such “models, organizations, 
and programs.”12 Similarly, the City’s first CHAS, submitted to HUD on January 10,199Z, 
included “perpetual affordability” among the five operating principles guiding Burlington’s 
1992-1996 plan for affordable housing:13 “The municipality should target its scarce resources 
toward organizations, projects, and models of tenure that ensure long-term retention of public 
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subsidies and long-term affordability for any-housing that is assisted using public dollars” 
(CEDO, 1992: 69). 
This spreading conceptual commitment to perpetual affordability was accompanied by an 
expanding programmatic commitment. The institutionalization of perpetual affordability in 
Burlington’s policies and plans, in other words, was accompanied by the institutionalization of 
perpetual affordability in the municipality’s grant making, loan making, and laws. Such 
programmatic support included the following: (1) existing municipal resources were redirected, 
(2) new resources were developed, (3) new ordinances were enacted, and (4) housing 
professionals employed by CEDO or under contract to CEDO were used to supplement the staff 
of CEDO’s nonprofit partners in expanding the number of privately owned, perpetually 
affordable units under their control. 
 
Redirecting Existing Resources 
Burlington's commitment to perpetual affordability began in 1983 when the new city treasurer 
discovered a surplus in the general fund. The Sanders administration invested part of that surplus 
to establish a community land trust, instead of supporting some other worthy project. This was 
the first of many such trade-offs that forced municipal officials to decide whether to direct 
limited resources already on hand into housing in general—and into housing with permanent 
affordability in particular. These were not easy choices, since Reagan’s budgetary ax had spared 
few domestic programs. Housing, in the early 1980s, was not the only unmet need in Burlington. 
Nevertheless, the Sanders administration made an early decision to commit a large portion of the 
discretionary funds at its disposal to affordable housing. Roughly half of the City’s annual 
allocation of Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds went to affordable housing 
from 1984 to 1992, (see Table 6-1). Equally significant was the later decision to distribute a 
growing percentage of these housing funds to nonprofit organizations operating outside City 
government; a nonprofit infrastructure for the development of perpetually affordable housing 
was thus created and sustained. Prior to 1986, for example, nearly 84 percent of the CDBG funds 
distributed by the City for affordable housing went to CEDO’s own Home Improvement 
Program (HIP), a low-interest revolving loan fund for residential rehabilitation. From 1986 on, 
CDBG funds for housing were increasingly redirected away from HIP and toward CEDO’s 
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nonprofit partners. Even those funds that remained in CEDO’s hands for HIP and for other 
housing initiatives were increasingly reserved for the nonprofits. This programmatic bias was 
made explicit in May 1988, when the “Applicant Qualifications” section of HIP’s policy manual 
was amended to read that “HIP places top priority on making loans to nonprofit organizations 
which are dedicated to providing perpetually affordable housing.” 
Table 6-1. Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Support for Nonprofit Housing: City 
of Burlington, FY1984-FY1992 
 
 
CDBG Year 
(Fiscal Year)   
Total  
CDBG 
CDBG  
for 
Housing 
%of      
Total 
CDBG 
CDBG for   
CEDO 
Housing  
    (HIP)      
% of 
CDBG  
Housing  
for 
CEDO     
CDBG for 
Nonprofit 
Housing 
% of 
CDBG   
Housing for  
Nonprofits   
CDBG 1983 
(FY’84) 
$778,000      NA NA NA NA  NA NA 
CDBG 1984 
(FY’85)
   
788,000     501,589       64         $451,944 90 $49,645 10      
CDBG 1985 
(FY’86) 
798,000     394,855        49   300,000  76   94,855* 24    
CDBG 1986 
(FY’87)
  
684,000 249,000        36   175,000  70   74,000 30    
CDBG 1987 
(FY’88) 
688,000 368,700       54 57,340  16 311,360 84     
CDBG 1988 
(FY’89) 
658,000 343,400        52 87,500  25 255,900 75       
CDBG 1989 
(FY’90) 
685,000 337,400      49   100,000  30 237,400 70  
CDBG 1990 
(FY’91) 
678,000 278,400       41 100,000  36 178,400 64   
CDBG 1991 
(FY’92) 
767,000 313,800        41 115,000 37 198,800 63 
NA, not available. 
*Includes $60,300 for the Burlington Housing Authority. 
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Although CDBG is the most significant example of municipal resources being redirected toward 
what the 1991 municipal plan referred to as “models, organizations, and programs that insure 
perpetual affordability,” there were others. A vacant fire station was conveyed for a dollar to the 
BCLT in 1986 for use as an emergency shelter for homeless families. The BHA directed Section 
8 certificates and vouchers to the BCLT, Lake Champlain Housing Development Corporation 
(LCHDC), and other nonprofits. And CEDO, after obtaining a $3.5 million Housing 
Development Action Grant (HoDAG) for the for-profit developer of a 148-unit project in 1984, 
applied for two HoDAGs for nonprofit developers in 1986: one for a 50-unit housing cooperative 
to be owned by the BCLT; another for an 80-unit rental project to be owned by LCHDC. The 
latter project was eventually awarded a $2.9 million HoDAG and was completed in 1989. 
 
Developing New Resources 
The City also developed new sources of funding for third sector housing. In 1987, the Burlington 
Employees Retirement System (BERS) was persuaded by the mayor and city treasurer to 
establish a $1 million line of credit for the BCLT. These funds helped the BCLT to bring thirty 
units of housing, including fourteen single-family homes, into its system of perpetual 
affordability. In 1992 BERS gave preliminary approval to a second $1 million investment in 
economic development and affordable housing—one not targeted specifically to the BCLT—to 
be made through the purchase of community development certificates of deposit from a local 
bank. 
Other favorable financing for the City’s nonprofit partners was secured by more indirect means. 
In 1988, CEDO organized and bankrolled a statewide conference on the federal Community 
Reinvestment Act. This conference spawned a new nonprofit organization, the Vermont 
Community Reinvestment Association (VCRA). During the next few years, VCRA mounted 
formal challenges against the Bank of Boston in its bid to acquire the Bank of Vermont and 
against Vermont Federal Bank in its application to transfer its downtown headquarters from 
Burlington to an affluent suburb nearby.14 Although both challenges were eventually rejected by 
federal regulators, community reinvestment became a public issue in Vermont for the first time. 
With VCRA and CEDO working to keep this issue alive, local lenders became unusually 
forthcoming in financially supporting nonprofit housing. 
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Bank support for the nonmarket models and nonprofit organizations of Burlington’s expanding 
third sector cannot be attributed solely to outside pressure, however. At least four other factors 
were at work. First of all, the nonprofit projects that the banks were being asked to finance were 
getting better all the time, as the nonprofits gained experience developing affordable housing. 
Unlike those of many for-profit developers, moreover, the projects planned by the nonprofits 
were neither postponed nor bankrupted by the downturn in the New England economy at the 
decade’s end. Second, the banks’ investment in Low Income Housing Tax Credits made some of 
these nonprofit projects more lucrative than they would otherwise have been (see n. 10). Third, 
the City announced in 1991 that it would, in the future, place its own accounts with institutions 
that not only offered the best depository services at the best rates, but demonstrated the best 
performance in meeting community credit needs. Finally, there was the Community Banking 
Council. First convened in 1989 by CEDO and the Bank of Vermont, the Community Banking 
Council brought municipal officials, bankers, and nonprofits together every other month for the 
next four years to discuss community reinvestment. One result of these ongoing discussions was 
increased bank involvement in neighborhoods and projects given high priority by CEDO and its 
nonprofit partners. 
The most significant step that the City has taken in institutionalizing its support for third sector 
housing occurred in 1989 when Burlington’s voters approved a property tax increase of one cent 
on every one hundred dollars of valuation to capitalize the City’s housing trust fund. This 
municipal fund had been created the year before to provide project subsidies for affordable 
housing and operational support for nonprofit housing organizations. The ordinance establishing 
the Burlington Housing Trust Fund was quite explicit in describing the kind of housing to be 
supported: “Priority in all disbursements intended for use in acquiring, constructing, 
rehabilitating, or financing housing units shall be given . . . to projects that guarantee the 
perpetual affordability of these units for very low, low, or moderate income households.” When 
the city’s residents voted in 1989 to raise their own taxes, therefore, they not only directly 
guaranteed long-term municipal support for nonprofit organizations like the BCLT and LCHDC 
that had been working so hard to address Burlington’s housing problems but indirectly endorsed 
the principle of long-term affordability that lay at the heart of these organizations’ housing 
efforts—and at the heart of the trust fund itself. 
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Regulatory Support 
Other provisions have been incorporated into the City’s code of ordinances that favor nonprofit 
developers and the private, nonmarket housing they produce. Such regulatory support comes in 
two different forms: projects and organizations that promote perpetually affordable housing have 
been granted privileges denied to others or they have been granted exemptions from conditions or 
fees required of others. 
Examples of the first are found in Burlington’s condominium conversion ordinance and in its 
inclusionary zoning ordinance. Enacted m 1987, the condominium conversion ordinance gives 
tenants in any building slated for conversion to condominium ownership 120 days to purchase 
their building from the current owner. Should they be unwilling or unable to accomplish this 
difficult feat, the City or a “designated housing agency” is granted the first right to purchase the 
building on the tenants’ behalf. A “designated housing agency,” according to the ordinance, is “a 
public entity or a 501 (c) (3) tax-exempt, nonprofit corporation whose purpose is creating or 
preserving housing for low or moderate income persons.” The city council eventually approved 
the BCLT, LCHDC, Cathedral Square, Inc., and the Burlington Housing Authority as 
“designated housing agencies.” 
A similar preemptive right to purchase residential property is granted these same “designated 
housing agencies” by the City’s inclusionary zoning ordinance enacted in 1990. For 120 days 
after building permits are issued for any residential project with five or more units, these 
agencies are given an exclusive option to purchase all of the project’s “inclusionary units” at a 
below-market price.15 Should these units not be acquired by a “designated housing agency,” they 
must still “remain affordable for a period of no less than ninety-nine years, commencing from the 
date of initial occupancy.” In short, the ordinance mandates perpetual affordability, regardless of 
who purchases an inclusionary unit. 
Regulatory support for third sector housing is also embodied in several key exemptions. 
Perpetually affordable rental housing is exempt from the annual “apartment inspection fee” 
collected from landlords for the support of Burlington’s minimum housing inspection program.16 
Limited equity cooperatives and other forms of perpetually affordable housing are permitted 
waivers from the City’s strict requirements for on-site parking. Affordable elderly housing is not 
subject to the same restrictions on density and coverage that govern other projects. And, as of 
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1992, impact fees on new residential development are reduced for housing that rents or sells at 
an affordable price. A 50 percent waiver of impact fees “for that portion of a residential project 
that meets the dual test of initial affordability and continuing affordability” is granted for projects 
serving households earning less than 75 percent of median income. A100 percent waiver of 
impact fees is granted for perpetually affordable projects serving households earning less than 50 
percent of median.17 
 
Staff Support 
Less obvious but no less important to the development of private, non-market housing has been 
the professional support provided by CEDO staff in supplementing the underpaid and 
overextended staff of the nonprofit sector, especially during the early stages of organizational or 
project development. Such support, it should be noted, has gone beyond the kind of clean-hands 
coaching from the sidelines that characterizes much of the “technical assistance” traditionally 
offered to neighborhood organizations by municipal officials. CEDO staff have often been on the 
field with their nonprofit partners, at the center of play, putting the administration’s own political 
and financial fortunes on the line. 
Organizational support has been paramount. Thus CEDO’s first housing director was the 
principal organizer and de facto director for the Burlington Community Land Trust during its 
first year of existence. CEDO’s second housing director was instrumental in founding the Lake 
Champlain Housing Development Corporation. CEDO’s third housing director helped to write 
the Vermont Cooperative Housing Ownership Act and to found the Champlain Valley Mutual 
Housing Federation. 18 All three played key roles in “saving” Northgate Apartments: first in 
building the capacity of the Northgate Tenants Association; then in convening the Northgate 
Task Force and covering the early costs of Northgate Nonprofit; and finally in participating in 
the creation of Northgate Housing, Inc., the managing co-general partner of the limited 
partnership that eventually purchased Northgate on behalf of its current residents. 
Project support has been equally important. CEDO employs a housing rehabilitation specialist 
and a housing development specialist, each of whom has sometimes functioned as a de facto 
member of a nonprofit project’s development team. 19 CEDO staff have written rehabilitation 
specifications and overseen the quality of finished work for a number of projects undertaken by 
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the nonprofits. On some occasions, CEDO staff have put together the early pro formas and 
financial packages that made a project possible. On other occasions, CEDO staff have played 
more of a trouble-shooting role, helping the nonprofits to work their way around unexpected 
obstacles in the development process. More recently, CEDO staff have themselves initiated 
several projects, securing site control and shepherding them through the early phases of the 
municipality’s own planning and permit process before turning them over to a nonprofit owner.20 
At times CEDO has also employed an independent contractor to provide full-time professional 
support for a nonprofit organization, someone who serves as a virtual member of an 
organization’s own staff for a period of one or more years. For example, a tenant organizer for 
the Northgate project was funded by CEDO from 1987 to 1989 to ensure active tenant 
participation in the planning and development of the nonprofit buyout of this expiring use 
project. Similarly, a specialist in cooperative housing was employed by CEDO from 1989 to 
1991, under a joint arrangement with the City of Winooski and the BCLT, to provide assistance 
to the first limited equity housing cooperatives being developed in Burlington and Winooski. 
This private contractor went on to become the founding director for the Champlain Valley 
Mutual Housing Federation. 
 
THE PROGRESSIVE RECORD: 1984-1992 
What was accomplished during these years of concentrated support for private, nonmarket 
housing and for the nonprofit sponsors of such housing? The outcomes can be considered under 
five headings: productivity, capacity, security, mobility, and constituency. 
 
Productivity 
From the end of 1984, the year in which CEDO began heavily investing in the establishment of a 
nonprofit infrastructure, to the end of 1992, approximately 800 units of housing were brought 
under some form of private price restriction through either the construction of new units or the 
acquisition and rehabilitation of existing units. All of these units will remain perpetually 
affordable. An additional 148 units—constructed, owned, and managed by a for-profit developer 
using a Housing Development Action Grant—were created with CEDO’s assistance outside of 
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the decommodified domain of the nonprofits. Since the tenants of this project have an option to 
buy out the developer after twenty years (or sooner, if he decides to sell) and since the entire $3.5 
million HoDAG provided by the City can be claimed by the tenants if they organize themselves 
into a limited equity cooperative, all of these units may eventually become part of Burlington’s 
expanding stock of third sector housing. 
In sum, a respectable quantity of privately owned, perpetually affordable housing was created 
during a period of sharp cutbacks in federal aid. Adding these new units of third sector housing 
produced since the mid-1980s to the preexisting stock of public housing, HUD 202 housing, and 
project-based Section 8 housing produced in the 1960s and 1970s, Burlington possessed 
approximately 1,600 units of nonmarket housing by the end of 1992. A little more than 10 
percent of the city’s entire stock of housing had been brought under some form of multiyear 
price control. 21 
Capacity 
The second accomplishment of Burlington’s third sector housing policy was the creation of a 
nonprofit infrastructure capable of acquiring, rehabilitating, constructing, and managing both 
single-unit and multiunit housing. Whether initially established by CEDO, partially sustained by 
CEDO, or intensively supported on a project-by-project basis by resources and policies 
emanating from CEDO, six different nonprofit organizations were brought to a point in their own 
development such that each possessed the professional staff, internal systems, and operational 
experience to carry out major housing projects. Three of these nonprofits—the Burlington 
Community Land Trust, Lake Champlain Housing Development Corporation, and Cathedral 
Square, Inc.—possessed the mission, motivation, and means to develop additional units of 
affordable housing on an annual basis. Only one of the city’s six housing nonprofits, Cathedral 
Square, already existed when the Progressives took over City Hall. 
Supplementing the newly created capacity of these private, nonprofit corporations was the 
revitalized capacity of the Burlington Housing Authority, a municipal corporation that was 
transformed from crippled infirmity to vigorous health. Besides providing better housing for its 
own tenants, the BHA entered the 1990s providing maintenance services for the BCLT; 
management advice for Northgate Housing, Inc.; board leadership for LCHDC; and rental 
subsidies for the BCLT, LCHDC, Northgate, and the Committee on Temporary Shelter (COTS). 
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Security 
The third accomplishment was to enhance the residential security of many who have been 
precariously housed. Despite the failures of rent control, an antispeculation tax, and just-cause 
eviction, significant progress was made during the 1980s in stabilizing rental costs and in 
reducing the speculative pressures that were causing tenant displacement. The existing stock of 
affordable rental housing was protected by the enactment of strict controls on conversion and 
demolition, the enhanced enforcement of minimum housing codes, the revitalization of the BHA, 
and the successful buyout of Northgate Apartments. At the same time, hundreds of new units 
were added to the affordable rental stock in and around Burlington by nonprofit organizations 
and for-profit developers taking advantage of the last few crumbs of federal support for 
affordable housing. A 1990 agreement between the City and the University of Vermont, 
moreover, imposed strict limits on the future growth in student enrollment, while committing 
UVM to construct new, on-campus housing for 544 students by 1995 (see n. 21). The combined 
effect of these measures, when magnified by an end-of-the-decade downturn in New England’s 
economy, was greater security for Burlington’s tenants. By the 1990s, rents had begun to 
moderate and the rental vacancy rate had crept above 5 percent for the first time in nearly two 
decades. 22 
Security of tenure was increased, as well, through new models of limited equity homeownership 
that enabled lower-income tenants for the first time to enjoy many of the rights reserved only for 
those who own their homes. These innovative models became, with CEDO’s support, an 
influential part of the city’s housing scene. 23 
Finally, CEDO’s efforts helped to increase the residential security of the city’s lower-income 
homeowners and the city’s homeless. Low-interest rehabilitation loans, free paint, and a reverse 
equity program for the payment of taxes and insurance helped lower-income homeowners to 
maintain, and retain, their housing. The creation of three emergency shelters, a transitional 
housing program, and ninety-five units of permanent SRO housing provided basic 
accommodations for the homeless. Although these efforts neither solved the problem of 
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homelessness nor saved the home of every person of modest means whose income or age had 
made homeownership a precarious proposition, progress was made on both fronts. 
 
Mobility 
A somewhat serendipitous outcome of enhancing the security and protecting the affordability of 
every rung on Burlington’s housing tenure ladder was the opening up of new opportunities for 
upward mobility from one rung to another. As missing rungs at the bottom of the tenure ladder 
were replaced, homeless families and homeless individuals found it easier to make their way into 
secure tenancy. As a pool of price-stabilized rental housing was developed by nonprofit 
organizations, tenants moved out of some of the worst for-profit rentals and into the best of the 
nonprofit rentals. As new rungs of limited equity housing were introduced into the yawning gap 
between for-profit rentals and market-priced homeowner-ship, lower-income households gained 
a firm foothold on homeownership, leaving tenancy behind. In short, the lateral mobility made 
possible by stabilizing the city’s rental market was matched by new opportunities for vertical 
mobility made possible by rebuilding the city’s housing tenure ladder. 24 
 
Constituency 
Finally, in building a broad-based consensus for affordable housing in general, and for third 
sector housing in particular, Burlington’s Progressives accomplished, during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, the political equivalent of a double somersault on a very high wire. They retained 
the allegiance of lower-income tenants while winning the acquiescence of moderate-income 
homeowners for a well-publicized policy of directing most of the City’s scarce resources for 
affordable housing toward a handful of nonprofit organizations promoting unusual models of 
tenure. 
These nonprofits, in turn, helped to broaden the base of popular support for precisely the sort of 
municipal activism being championed by the Progressives. Each of these organizations has 
members, beneficiaries, contributors, and staff numbering in the hundreds, a vocal constituency 
for affordable housing. Drawing on such support, neither the Sanders nor the Clavelle 
administration was ever alone, from about 1984 onward, when going before the city council or 
 24 
the city’s voters with a new housing initiative. It was this constituency, organized outside of City 
Hall, that helped to win such electoral victories as a condominium conversion ordinance and a 
one-cent tax increase for the housing trust fund. It was this constituency that helped to win such 
legislative victories as inclusionary zoning. 25 And it was this constituency that continued the 
fight for affordable housing— and for perpetual affordability—when the Progressives lost their 
grip on City Hall at last. 
 
BUILDING THIRD SECTOR HOUSING: CONTROVERSY AND CONFLICT 
Behind this record of accomplishment, a record summarized in Table 6-2, lay a ten-year political 
and ideological struggle between two very different approaches to housing development: on the 
one side, supporters of an activist administration who regarded the private market as a run-amok 
source of misery and mayhem that should be closely regulated; on the other, allies of private 
capital -- developers, landlords, business owners, bankers, and realtors -- who regarded that 
market as a self-regulating source of prosperity and profit that should be left alone. Between 
these two extremes, Burlington’s politicians and voters were forced to say again and again just 
how far they were willing to go in using the municipality’s powers and resources to modify the 
market character of privately owned housing. 
Although the supporters of perpetual affordability won many of these contests, the Progressives 
were frequently forced into political compromises that weakened this general commitment. They 
were sometimes forced to surrender the principle altogether. In 1990, for example, the Clavelle 
administration won city council approval for a ninety-nine-year affordability period for any units 
created under inclusionary zoning. The year before, the same administration had to accept a very 
modest ten-year affordability restriction on any “replacement units” created under the housing 
preservation and replacement ordinance. Another example: beginning in 1986, CEDO’s Home 
Improvement Program targeted most of its resources to the price-restricted housing of nonprofit 
developers, but it still made available a small number of low-interest loans and a large number of 
free cans of paint to low-income homeowners without restricting the future price of their 
homes.26 
Some of the most rancorous housing battles in Burlington—and some of the most concessionary 
compromises—had less to do with who the agent of development should be or what the duration 
 25 
of affordability should be than with whether development should occur at all. Factions within a 
particular neighborhood sometimes resisted a proposed housing project because they feared that 
the “wrong” type of people would live there, or they opposed construction of any sort on local 
lands that had long been vacant. Other factions within the city opposed development on general 
principle because of its impact on the environment, city services, or the quality of life. Caught in 
the cross fire of such sentiments, nonprofit developers, and the unfamiliar models of housing 
tenure promoted by them, sometimes became convenient targets for attacks that were rooted in a 
deeper bias against a particular class of people or a particular use of land. 
CEDO, too, became a frequent target: sometimes because of its backing for unpopular projects 
like SRO housing for the homeless but more often because of its relative autonomy within 
Burlington’s commission form of government. CEDO was the only major department, aside 
from administrative offices like the treasurer, clerk, and city attorney, without a commission 
appointed by the city council; it was the only major department accountable directly to the 
mayor. Its independence was further reinforced by its receiving nearly all of its funding from 
state and federal sources, not from municipal revenues controlled directly by the city council. 
The result was an activist, innovative, and politicized department doing research and 
development directly for the mayor, a result that never sat well with any of Burlington’s 
opposition parties, whether Democrat, Republican, or Green. Indeed, about the only issue on 
which all of them agreed was that CEDO was “out of control” and “unaccountable to the 
people.” By the early 1990s, CEDO was continually under attack, facing closer scrutiny by the 
city council and repeated calls by opposition parties for a commission to oversee its activities. 
Other kinds of conflict posed a more direct threat to Burlington’s hard-won consensus around 
third sector housing, for they emerged not out of fault lines in the political landscape surrounding 
the policy but out of stresses internal to the policy itself. The most common of these “internal” 
conflicts occurred between the municipality and its nonprofit partners. There were occasions 
when the municipality’s housing officials became frustrated with the cautious and crawling pace 
of nonprofit development and pressured the nonprofits to do more. On other occasions, the 
municipality’s political leaders became frightened by neighborhood resistance to a proposed 
development and pressured the nonprofits to do less. Such tensions became inevitable and 
unavoidable once the decision was made to rely upon a network of independent organizations, 
established outside municipal government, for the delivery of most housing services. As much as 
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Table 6-2. Burlington Housing Highlights, 1983-1992 
 
 
 
 
 Protection of the 
Vulnerable 
 
Preservation of Affordable 
Housing 
 
Production of Affordable 
Housing 
 
1983  Home Improvement Loan 
Program 
 
 
1984 Anti-discrimination 
Ordinance 
Burlington Community Land 
Trust  
Lake Champlain Housing 
Development Corporation 
 
Burlington Community Land 
Trust 
1985 Accessibility Grants 
Program Overhaul of 
Minimum Housing Code 
 
Overhaul of Minimum Housing 
Code 
Lake Champlain Housing 
Development Corporation 
Howe Meadow linkage 
project (40 units) 
 
1986 Security Deposits 
Ordinance 
Antispeculation tax (passed by 
city; rejected by state)  
Northgate task force 
 
Fairmount Place demolition 
project (40 units) 
 
1987 Reverse Equity Program for 
Elderly;  Condominium 
Conversion Ordinance 
BERS $1 million credit line for 
BCLT Condominium 
Conversion Ordinance 
Modernization program for 
BHA housing Apartment 
Inspection Fee Ordinance 
 
BERS $1 million credit line 
for BCLT South Meadow 
HoDAG (148 units) 
 
1988 Firehouse family shelter  
Just-cause eviction 
referendum             
(defeated by Burlington 
voters) 
Vermont Cooperative Housing 
Ownership Act Burlington 
Housing Trust Fund 
 
Firehouse family shelter (5 
units) 
Burlington Housing Trust 
Fund 
 
1989 Rehabilitation of Wilson 
SRO Housing Replacement 
Ordinance Accessibility 
requirements             added 
to building code 
Rehabilitation of Wilson SRO 
(22 units) 
Acquisition of Northgate (336 
units) 
Tax levy for Housing Trust 
Fund Housing Replacement 
Ordinance 
Salmon Run HoDAG (80 
units) 
Heineberg Senior Housing (80 
units) 
Tax levy for Housing Trust 
Fund Mini-Act 250: housing 
linkage 
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 Protection of the 
Vulnerable 
Preservation of Affordable 
Housing 
Production of Affordable 
Housing 
1990 St. John’s Hall SRO 
Transitional housing 
program Group housing 
zoning amendment 
 
Energy conservation bond ($11 
million) Champlain Valley 
Mutual Housing Federation 
St. John’s Hall SRO (21 units) 
Transitional housing program 
(9 units) Inclusionary Zoning 
Ordinance City/UVM 
agreement on student housing 
(544 new on-campus beds by 
1995) 
 
1991  Completion of $7 million 
Northgate rehabilitation First 
limited equity co-ops 
Wood Street inclusionary 
project (7 units) Employer-
assisted 10-cent housing 
program 
 
1992 Sarah Cole SRO 
Vermont Security Deposits 
Statute 
 
Rehabilitation of YWCA 
apartments 
$2 million Rehabilitation Loan 
Pool 
 
Sarah Cole SRO (12 units) 
Impact Fee Ordinance  
Flynn Avenue Co-op (28 
units) 
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these organizations might have depended upon City Hall for operational and project support, 
they were not always or automatically going to do the City’s bidding. 27 
There were also tensions among the nonprofits themselves. Multiple nonprofits may share a 
similar commitment to perpetual affordability, but they must still jockey for position and 
advantage in acquiring preferred properties, in securing scarce funding, and in ensuring their 
own survival. Competition increased as public funding for affordable housing continued to 
decline and as the nonprofits’ need for ever-more-elusive operational funding continued to grow. 
CEDO found itself more and more in the uncomfortable position of being forced to choose one 
nonprofit over another or being forced to act as a third party referee between two (or more) of its 
nonprofit partners. 28 
Finally, despite the Progressives’ best efforts to harmonize the separate halves of their housing 
policy, there existed from the very beginning a degree of tension between the strategy of 
empowering tenants and the strategy of decommodifying property. Nonprofit housing developers 
are not always the best landlords. They may know more about producing affordable housing than 
they know about managing it. They may lack the resources to fully rehabilitate rundown units 
purchased at a bargain to prevent the displacement of low-income tenants. They may be so 
focused on the long-term goal of converting their rental holdings to limited equity 
homeownership that they ignore the short-term necessity of operating rental housing in an 
effective, efficient manner. Whatever the reason, Burlington’s nonprofit housing in the beginning 
was not always as well managed as its occupants might have wished. Confrontations between 
local advocates for tenants rights and local providers of nonmarket housing became an 
occasional feature of the city’s housing scene. 
Even when nonprofit developers could be counted among the best landlords, they were 
sometimes accused of skimming off the best tenants: those with a little more money, a little more 
education, and a lot more tolerance for the interminable meetings that are often a part of third 
sector housing. There was some truth to this charge. Many of the units being developed by 
Burlington’s nonprofit organizations, “perpetually affordable” though they may be, were 
unaffordable and inaccessible for people with the lowest incomes and the greatest need. On the 
other hand, the accusation of skimming ignored the fact that both the BCLT and LCHDC, after 
1989, devoted part of their development efforts to permanent SRO housing for the homeless. The 
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BCLT, in addition, played a leading role in developing an emergency shelter for homeless 
families, transitional housing for mother-led families, a downtown service center for homeless 
individuals, and a new facility for the Chittenden County Emergency Food Shelf. It is worth 
remembering, as well, that the Committee on Temporary Shelter always focused on the poorest 
of the poor and that Northgate Housing, Inc., saved the home of every tenant who was in 
residence at the time of its successful buy-out of Northgate’s 336 apartments. 
In the end, these conflicts and controversies do less to overshadow the many accomplishments of 
Burlington’s progressive housing policy than they do to highlight the many obstacles an activist 
municipal government confronted, and managed mostly to overcome, in comprehensively 
addressing a clear crisis in affordable housing. The most formidable obstacle confronting the 
City of Burlington, on the other hand, was circumvented more than it was ever overcome. 
Rooted neither in conflicts surrounding third sector housing nor in stresses internal to the policy 
itself, the greatest impediment to the City’s progressive housing policy remained the decade-long 
indifference of a national administration dedicated to doing less, not more, for affordable 
housing. Every housing accomplishment of both the Sanders and the Clavelle administrations 
must be seen against the harsh backdrop of this dwindling federal commitment. Whatever was 
done for affordable housing during the years of Progressive rule was accomplished despite a 
shrinking pool of federal funds. 29 
The election of Bill Clinton raised hopes that this federal drought might finally be coming to an 
end. If so, Burlington was well prepared. Unlike most U.S. cities, Burlington’s capacity for 
effectively and efficiently utilizing public dollars had been heightened during the 1980s, rather 
than diminished. CEDO had developed the systems, the partners, and the personnel to administer 
any new housing program that Washington might devise. The Burlington Housing Authority, 
after renewing itself and revitalizing all of its older units, was ready for new challenges. A 
handful of nonprofit organizations were developing and managing hundreds of units of 
perpetually affordable rental and owner-occupied housing and were beginning to tackle the 
redevelopment of some of the city’s worst inner-city blocks. In short, after years of private effort 
and public support an organizational infrastructure was firmly in place that was capable of 
responding immediately and productively to whatever additional resources for affordable 
housing might be forthcoming from the new administration in Washington. 
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But on April 5,1993, Burlington got a new administration of its own. Just as twelve years of 
Republican rule were being brought to an end in Washington, twelve years of Progressive rule 
were brought abruptly to an end in Burlington. Peter Clavelle was defeated for reelection to a 
third term as mayor and replaced by a conservative Republican who had campaigned on the 
theme that local government needed to get “back to basics”: fire, police, schools, and streets. 30 
Conspicuously missing from this very short list was any mention of a municipal role in 
promoting affordable housing. It seemed likely that City Hall’s past policy of aggressive support 
for nonmarket housing and nonprofit development was about to change. The expansion and 
survival of Burlington’s third sector would be determined, during the next few years, not by 
activists inside city government but by those inside the nonprofit organizations, limited equity 
cooperatives, and land trust homes that an activist government had helped to create. The future 
was now in their hands. 
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NOTES 
Acknowledgments: Critical comments were offered on earlier drafts of this chapter by Tim 
McKenzie, Brenda Torpy, Erhard Mahnke, Kirby White, and Tom Dillon. Their assistance is 
gratefully acknowledged. Any errors of fact, emphasis, or interpretation that remain are the 
responsibility of the author alone. Unintended distortion is always a risk whenever a chronicler 
of past events was also a participant in them (see n. 18). 
 
1      Burlington’s population of 37,712 in 1980 occupied 13,763 units of housing. By 1990, the 
city’s population of 39,127 was housed in 15,480 units. This housing was 60 percent rental 
and 40 percent owner occupied, percentages that have remained fairly constant over two 
decades. 
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2     The origins, constituencies, issues, and struggles of Burlington’s Progressive movement are 
examined in greater detail by Clavel (1986), Soifer (1988), Guma (1989), Conroy (1990), 
Rosdil (1991), and Wimpey (1992). 
 
3      During the entire period under discussion, 1981-1993, Progressive allies of the Sanders and 
Clavelle administrations never held more than six seats on Burlington’s thirteen-member 
city council. 
4      Prior to 1983, federal CDBG funds were distributed locally by the Burlington Planning 
Department and the Burlington Planning Commission, both dominated by political cronies 
of the previous Democratic regime. By convincing HUD to make Burlington an entitlement 
city, with its own allocation of CDBG funds, and by assigning these funds to an executive 
office accountable directly to the mayor, the Sanders administration increased its ability to 
set the City’s development agenda and reduced the Democrats’ ability to block that agenda. 
5      The importance of having a well-run, sympathetic, and supportive housing authority backing 
the Progressives’ efforts to establish a permanent pool of privately owned, price-restricted 
housing is underscored by Allen David Heskin’s (1991) account of a ten-year struggle to 
establish limited equity cooperatives in a Los Angeles neighborhood. In the latter case, the 
housing authority’s own incompetence was combined with suspicion and hostility toward 
the co-op model, making the housing authority more of a hindrance than a helper in this 
grassroots effort to develop third sector housing for lower-income people. In Burlington, 
from 1985 onward, the opposite was true. 
6      The successful multiyear struggle to “save” Northgate, the nation’s first tenant-led buy-out 
of an “expiring use” project under the 1987 federal Preservation Act, is described in more 
detail in Torpy (1988), Wallace (1991), and Achtenberg (1992). 
7      Although the landlord-tenant relationship is a traditional one, the guarantees of long-term 
affordability are not. Affordability is ensured not only by the nonprofit status of the owner, 
but by loan conditions imposed by the City, deed covenants imposed by the Vermont 
Housing and Conservation Board, or grant conditions imposed by federal rules. On several 
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projects, affordability controls have been further enhanced by giving the BCLT the land 
under these projects or a first option to purchase them. 
8      In reality, Democrats on and off the city council were vigorous opponents of the BCLT 
during its early years. One year after the BCLT was founded, for example, CEDO negotiated 
a linkage agreement with a private developer that would have added forty newly constructed 
single-family houses to the BCLT. Prominent Democrats immediately attacked this plan. 
With these Democratic leaders stirring the caldron, an angry citizen’s group arose within the 
area where the planned BCLT housing was to be built. This group named itself HALT, 
Homeowners against the Land Trust. In the end, the forty houses were built, but the 
opposition was successful in limiting to six the number of houses that became part of the 
BCLT. 
9       In 1985, the cost of ignoring these speculative pressures on affordable housing was made 
painfully clear to every tenant organizer and housing activist in northern Vermont. Two 
publicly subsidized housing projects on the outskirts of Burlington, Thorn Hill Apartments 
and Indian Brook Apartments, were converted to market-rate rentals and condominiums, 
displacing 142 lower-income households. The unsuccessful but widely publicized fight to 
prevent the loss of these affordable units convinced many activists that new models of 
nonspeculative housing had to be found. 
10     Although the focus here is on municipal policy, it is important to note that perpetual 
affordability also became a key aspect of state policy during the late 1980s, at least insofar 
as that policy was embodied in programs and priorities of the Vermont Housing and 
Conservation Board, the Vermont Housing Finance Agency, and Housing Vermont. The 
most expensive and most successful housing projects undertaken by CEDO’s nonprofit 
partners would simply not have been possible without the financial backing of these three 
statewide organizations. Vermont has been especially far-sighted in its use of Low Income 
Housing Tax Credits, directing most of these credits (via Housing Vermont) toward projects 
with nonprofit partners committed to preserving affordability long after the tax benefits are 
depleted. More information on Vermont’s commitment to perpetual affordability can be 
found in Harmon (1992) and Libby (1996). 
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11     One of Sanders’s closest political allies, Terry Bouricius, had invited representatives from 
the Institute for Community Economics to meet Sanders in January 1982. The seeds for a 
community land trust (CLT) in Burlington were planted in this early meeting. It was not 
until the fall of 1983, however, that Progressives were able to bring a proposal for CLT 
funding before the city council. Most of the public debate surrounding this proposal 
emphasized the homeownership aspects of this housing model, not its potential for 
“decommodifying” private property. A different debate went on within the administration 
and the Progressive Coalition. It focused on two issues: whether a CLT should concentrate 
on new construction on the waterfront or on rehabilitation in existing neighborhoods, and 
whether a CLT should be one housing program among many or the centerpiece for all of 
CEDO’s housing efforts. 
12     Although the political lead in making perpetual affordability the cornerstone of the City’s 
policies and programs was clearly taken by CEDO, it should be noted that the Planning 
Department was equally committed to this principle after 1986. A new planning director, 
Mark Eldridge, was hired that year. Under Eldridge, Burlington’s Planning Department was 
just as likely as CEDO to propose innovative ways of promoting and preserving the 
affordability of newly constructed housing. 
13     The other four “operational principles” in Burlington’s 1992 Comprehensive Housing 
Affordability Strategy were “municipal activism,” “redistribution of benefits and burdens,” 
“balance of stability and mobility,” and “nonprofit partnership.” 
14     During the challenge against the Bank of Boston, Mayor Sanders, the city attorney, and 
CEDO attempted to enter the legal fray on the side of VCRA. They were prevented from 
doing so by a negative vote from the Democratic-Republican majority on city council. The 
administration was successful in winning approval from the council only for a resolution 
creating a Community Banking Council. 
15     The percentage of inclusionary units required in any given project runs from 10 percent to 
25 percent, depending upon the sales price of the market units and the location of the 
project. The price of these inclusionary units is set at 65 percent of median for rental projects 
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and 75 percent of median for sales projects. Also included is a density bonus of 15 percent 
to 25 percent. 
16    The revenues raised by this fee also pay for staffing the City’s Housing Board of Review, a 
municipal commission that, among other duties, ensures that landlords return tenants’ 
security deposits. Another portion of this fee has been used to support a landlord-tenant 
resource center. 
17     From 1989 to 1990, CEDO convened and staffed the Regulatory Review Task Force, a 
committee of public officials, private developers, and affordable housing advocates 
appointed by the city council to evaluate the impact of municipal regulations and fees on the 
development of new housing. Among the fifty-six findings and suggestions of this task force 
in its final report was the recommendation that “City Council should consider deferring or 
waiving all impact fees for affordable housing” (CEDO, 1990:10). Two years later, a 
CEDO-sponsored ordinance implementing this recommendation was enacted by the city 
council. 
18     CEDO had three different housing directors during the period 1983-1993: Brenda Torpy 
(1983—1985); Amy Wright (1985—1986); and John Davis (1986— 1993). Despite such 
turnover, CEDO’s third sector housing policy remained remarkably consistent for over a 
decade. This was due to four factors: overlapping terms of service allowed all three housing 
directors to work closely together in putting this policy in place; a succession of Progressive 
city councillors with a special interest in third sector housing helped to keep this policy on 
track; both of CEDO’s directors, Peter Clavelle and Michael Monte, had backed the policy 
from the very beginning; and the same person presided over this policy during the entire 
period, first as CEDO’s director and then as mayor. Clavelle’s particular contribution was 
recognized in 1992 when Shelterforce named him “one of the country’s best elected officials 
when it comes to securing decent housing for all” (1992: 9). 
19     CEDO staff who have played such key supporting roles for the nonprofits have been Amy 
Wright, Jeffery Glassberg, Tom Dillon, and Richard Moffi. (Moffi also served as acting 
housing director in CEDO during Davis’s one-year absence, 1992—1993.) 
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20     Sometimes, of course, projects being developed by CEDO’s nonprofit partners have needed 
technical support that cannot be provided by CEDO staff, especially when a project’s initial 
feasibility was being evaluated. CEDO has often helped to defray these predevelopment 
costs. At other times it was not the feasibility of a new housing project that was in question 
but the feasibility of a new housing model. Prior to the BCLT’s incorporation in 1984, for 
example, CEDO hired a private attorney to research the authority under Vermont law for 
this unusual housing model. Similarly, prior to the development of Vermont’s first limited 
equity cooperatives, CEDO joined with other co-op advocates to help push a cooperative 
housing enabling act through the state legislature (in 1988) and then to assist in the 
preparation and dissemination of model documents for the formation of cooperative housing 
corporations (in 1989). 
21    Despite their focus on third sector housing, both the Sanders and Clavelle administrations 
devoted significant resources to producing and preserving units of housing that were neither 
owned by nonprofits nor perpetually encumbered by price controls. These units are part of 
the Progressive record, even if somewhat removed from the epicenter of Progressive policy. 
Included in this count are approximately 450 units of housing rehabilitated with grants and 
loans from CEDO’s Home Improvement Program; 77 modestly priced units constructed by 
private developers under a CEDO-negotiated linkage agreement and a HUD demonstration 
program; and 544 dormitory beds planned for construction by 1995 under a 1990 agreement 
between the University of Vermont (UVM) and the City. The last was the result of nine 
years of municipal pressure on UVM, which culminated in the City’s refusal to issue 
planning or building permits for newer university facilities until UVM committed to the 
construction of additional on-campus housing. 
22    The 1990-1992 recession introduced a spate of new problems, however: vacant buildings, 
bank foreclosures, and deferred maintenance. Throughout the 1980s, much of the City’s 
housing policy was premised on coping with problems of speculative reinvestment. The 
1990s opened with the specter of disinvestment hanging over Burlington’s older 
neighborhoods. By the end of 1992, this changing economic climate had caused three shifts 
in City policy: priority was being given to the rehabilitation of existing housing over the 
construction of new housing; the minimum housing inspection program was being 
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overhauled (once again); and reductions in impact fees were being offered to the developers 
of affordable housing. 
23    Although any form of homeownership customarily ensures far more security than any form 
of tenancy, security of tenure is also a priority of Burlington’s nonprofit landlords. All 
subscribe to the principle that eviction should be for “just cause” only, a principle that the 
city’s for-profit landlords would have been forced to adopt if a just-cause eviction charter 
change had been approved by Burlington’s voters in 1988. It wasn’t, so they didn’t. 
24    This aspect of Burlington’s housing program received national recognition in 1991 as one of 
twenty-five outstanding “Innovations in State and Local Government,” an awards program 
of the Ford Foundation and Harvard’s JFK School of Government. CEDO’s comprehensive 
and creative commitment to “rebuilding the housing tenure ladder” was chosen as a finalist 
out of nineteen hundred state and local programs reviewed by the Innovations staff. Earlier, 
one of CEDO’s principal partners in rebuilding the tenure ladder received international 
recognition for its innovative approach to affordable housing. In 1987, the Burlington 
Community Land Trust received a “Special Merit Award” from the United Nations 
International Year of Shelter for creating “a new kind of partnership in the fight against 
poverty... that links needy families, the private sector, and government.” 
25     Inclusionary zoning is a good example of the political effectiveness of the nonprofit 
network. This measure was brought to the city council in 1985 as an ordinance and in 1987 
as a recommendation of the Affordable Housing Task Force. It was voted down both times. 
Three years later, it was enacted into law. What had changed? In 1990, when for-profit 
developers asserted they could not build housing with a mandatory affordability component, 
nonprofit developers challenged their conclusions. Having neutralized the “expert 
witnesses” for the opposition, the nonprofits helped to create the political space for a liberal 
Democrat and two liberal Republicans to vote with Progressive members of the city council. 
26     With the advent of HOME in 1992, another exception was made. CEDO used its first 
$500,000 in HOME funds to create a $2 million loan pool for the rehabilitation of multiunit 
housing. (The balance of these funds was provided by the Vermont Housing Finance 
Agency.) These low-interest loans were made available not only to nonprofit developers 
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promising long-term affordability but to for-profit developers willing to abide by HOME’S 
affordability restrictions and willing to invest in distressed areas targeted by CEDO. 
27     Other sources of tension between City Hall and its nonprofit partners were impact fees on 
new housing and property taxes on existing, price-restricted housing. The nonprofits argued 
that the City should not give subsidies for affordable housing with one hand and take them 
back with the other. The issue of impact fees was addressed in 1992 (see n. 17). The issue of 
property taxes remained unresolved. 
28     The principal source of tension among CEDO’s nonprofit partners has been the competition 
for operating funds. Having helped to create a diverse network of nonprofit housing 
organizations, CEDO has had to find new ways of helping to sustain this network over time. 
This quest has met only limited success. Even when combining CDBG, HOME, and the 
City’s housing trust fund, CEDO has never had many resources to direct toward the general 
operations of its nonprofit partners. Barring a new federal housing program or dramatic 
changes in the rules governing CDBG and HOME, this is a problem that will only grow 
worse.  
29     It should be pointed out, however, that CEDO was unusually aggressive and remarkably 
successful in going after whatever federal dollars remained. When it came to larger projects 
like Northgate Apartments and the Flynn Avenue Co-op, moreover, CEDO had a 
Washington ally in its quest for scarce federal funds: Senator Patrick Leahy. Without the 
help of Senator Leahy and his legislative aid, John Romano, Burlington would have been 
harmed far worse by cutbacks in federal housing assistance than it was. 
30     How much this message of minimalist government might have contributed to Clavelle’s 
defeat is difficult to say. After all, Clavelle won four out of six of Burlington’s wards in the 
1993 election, and the Progressive Coalition retained six out of thirteen seats on the city 
council. The key issue in the 1993 campaign, moreover, was a wildly unpopular “domestic 
partners” measure supported by Clavelle and enacted by the city council a month before the 
election. This issue was successfully exploited by Clavelle’s opponent who as a member of 
the city council had voted against the “domestic partners” measure. 
 
